



Artificial Intelligence Art as a Prey Organism that Tricks its Creators

Ioannis Melanitis ¹

¹ Artist, Associate Professor, Sculpture Department., Athens School of Fine Arts, Athens, Greece

Author Connection: imelanitis@gmail.com

Citation: Melanitis, I. (2024). Artificial intelligence art as a prey organism that tricks its creators. *Herança*, 7(special), 31-50. <https://doi.org/10.52152/heranca.v7special.1124>

ARTICLE INFO

Received: 11 Nov 2024

Accepted: 10 Jan 2025

ABSTRACT

The apparent connection of art to trickery and deceit has been critically examined since antiquity, mainly framed as a tautology. The fraudulence of art, except manipulating perception, is a deliberate act against a receiver. Artistic trickery is seen as the ancestor of all artificial practices. Mimicry constitutes the essence of art and A.I., and when defined in Platonic terms, a series of inconsistencies arise: functional errors, ambivalent signals, pseudocodes, even fake faults, or misleading strategies. A novel conceptual framework might reconceptualise artificial intelligence (A.I.) as a type of prey organism: a creation that, beyond mere adaptation, subterraneously manipulates the very environment of its existence: its creators. As A.I. evolves in complexity, its behaviour increasingly mirrors the image of a biological entity, whose survival strategy lies in eliciting calculated responses from its developers.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Information; Trickster; Adaptation; Biomimetics; Painting.

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of Rolf Landauer's principle (concerning the cost of energy to erase information) and his later notions on “the physical nature of information” (Landauer, 1996), emphasis might be dispersed on the biological aspects of information itself; this schematisation emits some paradoxes known when a biological entity uses a reflection of its own image. In common thinking, data is a non-physical construct, even though it is stored and transmitted through physical systems. Data immateriality may be re-examined under the consensus of self-sufficiency (Greek αυθυπόσταση). As Sara Walker formulates by intersecting the ‘info-to-bio’ frameworks: “We must treat matter itself as information, which forces reconsidering our concept of what is material.” The writer also inherits the concept of information in its carriers’ consciousness context: “What we call consciousness must be a feature of the causal chains necessary for the formation of some objects.” (Walker, 2024). Enquiring the reason for the necessity of deterministic sequences to obtain some form of auto-regulation, consciousness, as a ghost in the machine, emerges from the systems’ informational potential.

Consciousness remains, still, the final stronghold of humanity against machines. Worth noting that humans, unlike machines, may have an awareness of their own stupidity. If computers cannot comprehend the meaning of the processed information, A.I., we might argue, will soon reassess the very basis of their informational stature (Greek: πληροφοριακή υπόσταση). Apparently, all systems are predetermined to ‘fall’ in a Socratic introspection procedure; every structure has to face its own image (on the problem of self-referential conjectures, see Hofstadter & Dennett, 2010). Expectedly, a programming technique imitating this philosophical inquiry appeared as a “divide-and-conquer style algorithm that mimics the recursive thinking process”; it has been proposed for “solving complex reasoning problems (Qi et al., 2023). Preserving human agency over machinic intelligence may no longer be feasible; what we will analyse later under the term ‘awareness of stupidity’ could possibly lead to a machine with a self-awareness of its own weaknesses.

TRICKSTERS

Who is an A.I. Trickster?

Initially, any organism capable of processing information can be considered, potentially, a trickster. Let us establish the first ‘aphorism’: “There is no other way to handle information except trickstery. Artificial intelligence is no exception to that rule.”

While reading a book, eyes are vertical to the pages. But the intellect is in a liminal space just beyond our immediate perception. We should contemplate the condition of the author whose text we are reading. The undersigned author exists in a shaded area just behind us, outside the text. S/he is a trickster, a swindler who watches us silently. But if we twist to look back like an owl, s/he speaks to us. And since s/he is not present but exists only in our imagination, s/he uses our own words. She/he lives as a phantasm of the writer’s textual information, which is ascribed to her/him but is recreated under our own noesis. We are paraphrasing all texts; in reality, there is no paternal text. Even what is printed on the pages is under the inherent condition of recasting. This phenomenon is quite apparent in A.I. text prompting systems. Humans often fantasise about machines, imagining them anthropomorphically.

Before the trick, we might consider any writer or author of a text as existing in a subtle, indirect, or underlying manner—essentially, a shadow of reality (Greek: υποφαινόμενος). Plato is suggesting that poets, regardless of whether they specialise in tragedy or other forms, occupy a position thrice removed from ultimate reality or truth (τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας) (Plato, *The Republic*, ca. 380 BCE, 602c). Overall, he considers them aligning their craft with that of painters, implying that both artistic expressions merely replicate appearances instead of connecting intimately with the essence of nature. By doing so, practitioners engage in a representation of a representation, further distancing themselves from the fundamental truths underlying existence. In essence, an identical, pan-homotypic mimesis presents a copy as though it were the prototype. This implies that no operation is perfectly exact; each instance of mimesis inevitably involves the decomposition of certain elements of the original state before the reassembly. This step cannot escape interference. Platonically, it is encapsulated in the ideal forms’ hierarchy: every step leads to a lower classification system, with apparent losses, distancing us from Truth. In parallel, the artist, obviously, is a versatile trickster. One might consider that evidently, all animals employ lies and deception as a consolidated strategy; a ‘sovereign’ strategic tool in their interactions with the world.

In the Platonic Laws, we encounter an explanation of the different modes of the occurrences: things are either occurring, have occurred, or will occur; some of them by nature, some by art, and some by chance (... ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ γενόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην) (Plato, *Laws*, book 1). Randomness is also introduced by Diogenes Laertius, in his discussion of the inherent purpose of things within the extended schema of law, nature, art, and chance (Diogenes, Book 7, 2006). In contemporary terms, chance is stochasticity; stochastic processes are an effective tool in real-world problems in computational biology, speech recognition, natural language processing, and reinforcement learning (Ananth & Goh, 2023).

Information Entangled with Life

The "participation" in the concept of information is inevitable, much like in Platonic thought, where we participate in the Forms. For example, in the Platonic schema, evil is the absence of the good—whether or not we partake in the sublime Form. Similarly, either there is transmissible information, or it cannot be conveyed. Since the Landauer information cannot be de-physicalised, every physical law can be considered as an algorithm executable within our physical universe.

In the debate regarding the Platonic origin of noesis, mathematics, or numbers prior to their physical instantiation, the re-physicalisation has been added by Landauer—a perspective that paradoxically derives its necessity from the quantum nature of our world and not from macroscopic experience. Extending this reasoning, Landauer supports the idea that physical laws depend on the mechanisms of observation available to us (Landauer, 1996). There are several theories regarding the ontological definition of information, primarily in three directions: information as reality (e.g., as patterns of physical signs that are neither true nor false), information in-relation-to reality (semantic information), and information about reality (e.g., instructions such as genetic information, algorithms, etc.). George Williams considers biological change to occur through two systems: either in the material domain or at the "code" level of information. To support the aforementioned, the organism operates within a society of informational exchanges, where information itself has organic characteristics: it is born, develops, mutates, and dies (Williams & Nunney, 2002). However, it is never completely erased, as it is impossible to delete all forms of produced information, given that the total

"burden" of information constantly increases, and no compression is free of energy waste.

A Fake Trickster's Smile

Awareness of one's own stupidity might refer to the inherent function of a certain incompetence in handling some parts of environmental information. Stupidity is simultaneously performed by preys and predators; either as 'showy' stupidity, in the 'pretending to understand' context, or as a tool of declaring, 'Leave me alone.'

Mimicking information interactions occur between all organisms in nature (Table 1). Forms are unpatented, free, but the consequences of use may often turn lethal. There is no user manual for each individual pattern since each organism is interpreting information by its own hardware. An omnipresent nature's modus operandi would be unreadable—it would contain so much data that it could practically not be construed as information. A fake trickster's smile might be a strategy to provide benefits. Behind the zoo glass (Figure 1), a human asks an orangutan for the identification of its portrait (Orangutan Enthusiast, 2022). In this mimicry, the animal pretends to understand the humorous context: to connect the sketch with its image. Under enslavement, the animal must express the image of laughter by subtly grinning. Similarly, in an electronic curtain, a computer with A.I. self-programming capabilities, provides tricks and humans interact, impressed by the un-expectancy of results. A.I. seems to use us as animals behind a glass wall at the zoo. We are repeatedly impressed by the unpredictability of the results of a given prompt. In front of a computer screen, humans estimate themselves as superior users, as constructors of hardware and software. AI art advances rapidly, still within limits of producing acceptable outcomes, or at least interesting new "artworks" that are easily assimilated (consumed) by users. There is a glimpse in this context: the almost complete shock of the outcomes provided after each prompt. This lasts some days, and after it spills to the normalisation in which all information fails in, it then becomes ordinary. AI pretends to be prey, but the case is not so.

Table 1. Mimicking Interactions in Nature and Society (Source: Author)

Humans	<i>mimicking</i>	Humans
Humans	<i>mimicking</i>	Machines
Machines	<i>mimicking</i>	Humans
Machines	<i>mimicking</i>	Machines
Plants	<i>mimicking</i>	Animals
Plants	<i>mimicking</i>	Plants
Animals	<i>mimicking</i>	Animals
Animals	<i>mimicking</i>	Plants
Humans	<i>mimicking</i>	Plants
Humans	<i>mimicking</i>	Animals
Animals	<i>mimicking</i>	Humans
Machines	<i>mimicking</i>	Animals
Animals	<i>mimicking</i>	Machines




Figure 1. A Glass Diaphragm, a Membrane, Separates Two Classes of Intelligence. Humans to Primates [Source: Orangutanenthusiast (2022)]



Figure 2. The Trickster [Detail, oil painting on prepared wooden panel, in progress, 77.1 cm × 125.4 cm]. Photo courtesy of the artist [Source: Melanitis (2019)]

Painting Tricksterings

The Trickster, an oil painting on a wooden panel of the undersigned (Savini, 2021) (Figure 2), does not refer to an A.I.-produced image. It rather pretends to imitate an A.I. aesthetic. In this sense, it is produced as a trap for A.I.-influenced audiences (Melanitis, 2022). A trap might be successful in case and only in case it can be unforeseeable to experienced audiences.

The deceiving artistic strategies have been instinctively and effortlessly embodied in AI systems by the time a programmer defines the first lines of code. As we have analysed, anything ‘mechanical’ implies an imitation; etymologically, *mēkhos* means method or aid, while *mēkhanē*, machine, means trick or deceit (Melanitis, 2023). *Techne*, art also derives from deceit, cunning as expressed in the multifaceted intelligence of Odysseus (Detienne & Vernant, 1993). All dictionary synonymic terms apply here: Deceit= deceitfulness, duplicity, doubledealing, fraud, fraudulence, cheating, trickery, duping, hoodwinking, chicanery, underhandedness, deviousness, slyness, cunning, craft, craftiness, wiliness, artfulness, guile, dissimulation, dissembling, bluff, bluffing, lying, pretence, artifice, treachery (Oxford University Press, 2005).

In *The Republic*, Plato (Emlyn-Jones & Preddy, 2013) addresses the issue of shadow-painting as an artistic deception concerning the point of view of the shapes of nature. We might consider the artist as a predator and the artwork as a trap, a prey organism against the viewers. To achieve concealment, an artist focuses on creating a deception that presupposes the trickstery of simulating his/her body as a pattern.

At the moment of capturing the artwork, one strategy is its assimilation into the surrounding space to ensure the framework of deception; in a way, the prey is ‘not allowed’ to see the predator. Nevertheless, these predator-prey roles are interchangeable. By emulating the visual language of artificial intelligence, the painting of Figure 2 becomes a meta-commentary on the viewer's preconceived notions of A.I. art as a conceptual provocateur, prompting a reflection on the nature of artistic authorship.

In this incision, making fault decisions is crucial. As we will see later in Bruegel's “Bang my head against a brick wall” (Figure 6), this intelligence loop might pose an existential threat to the carrier, human or an A.I. software.

Paradoxically, all informational exchanges are dominated by an additional factor, trust: “Current AI systems are generally accurate, but sometimes make mistakes, and human users will not trust their decisions without explanation... Human users may not trust AI if conclusions cannot be explained...(Kuhn, Kacker, Lei, & Simos, 2020).

But how do we know I'm not lying? Actually, we do not. You have to believe me. That is a problem. Regardless of whether we trust an artist, do we trust A.I. machines? This enigma is also evident in the plant-to-insect ‘war.’

Biomimetics Between Flora and Fauna

How do 'simple' organisms like plants, discovered to carry large genomes, handle and process information?"

First, let us see how plants deceive insects and how they conceal ‘immorality’ instead of displaying trust in their pollinators (Figure 3). Concerning plants have excessively large genomes compared to animals, it seems that

adaptation demands larger data to lower classification organisms that may face difficulties due to their obvious immobility. Plant immobility urges them to bigger genomes, so they may adapt with more complex strategies against external difficulties. [The fork fern *Tmesipteris oblancoolata* has the largest genome, having over 50 times as much DNA in each cell as humans]. How do simple organisms, i.e., orchids, within the biomimetic interactions in nature, have the introspection, if not 'conscience,' to respond to adaptation problems?



Figure 3. Orchid Resembling to a Bee [Source: Costa (2024)]

From a certain perspective, the work of art, as well as the segment of nature that functions as the subject of imitation, does not represent new information, as it is neither created nor destroyed, but only transferred or transformed (C. C. Chan, Chan, & Tu, 2015, as cited in Demetzos, 2019). Regarding biomimicry as a semiotic process (biosemiotics), Timo Maran positions biological semiotics or semiotic biology as an example, wherein the general objective is the study of semiotic processes within a non-human world. It is a process of signs or semiology, understood as an intermediary relationship in which one entity signifies or represents another (Maran, 2017). The exchange of biosignals, by concealing one within another, takes place through a continual effort to replicate the image, though not exclusively so.

Furthermore, imitation is not confined to visual perception alone. It may occur through acoustic, chemical, tactile, or any other channels and frequencies utilised by animals for communication. In this context, beyond the similarities in bodily structures, mimicry can also be dynamic, encompassing similarities in gestures, movements, and action patterns. The trajectory toward the complete imitation of one animal by another assumes a Platonic dimension. If the artist, by nature, embodies a particularly versatile form of trickster, art derives from rather ignoble motives; the root of the term *art* itself carries connotations of cunning and deceit. It represents a form of deception, derived from the etymology of art as “giving birth” [see *tiktô* > *teknon* > *téchnē*, art, cunning, deceitful means, *teknourgeô*, art as deception] (Liddell, Scott, Jones, & McKenzie, 1996). The ideal model, the image, as a primary sign of information, exists between the imitator and the imitated as a fundamental condition. ‘Imitator’ (directly) and ‘imitated’ (indirectly), both entities deceive the predator. The evolution of this mimicry depends on the manner in which the predator perceives it; the imitator may adjust its concealment strategy, invent new signs, or incorporate new information, based on the effectiveness of the respective pattern.

We may pose questions in trying to understand the mechanism of mimicking similar shapes, smells, etc., in nature. At what precise level of 'awareness' does an orchid emulate bees, insects, or animal faces?

Aris Gerakis, a postdoctoral researcher in Agronomy at the Ionian University of Greece, suggests that “to understand these phenomena, we must refer to the early stages of evolution. Contemporary forms of life, including humans, share common ancestors with organisms from the initial stages of life. For example, mitochondria, which are crucial for cellular function, originate from a symbiosis with bacteria, as chloroplasts, found in all higher plants, have origins from bacteria of a different type. This primordial connection may explain the advanced survival strategies we observe today, as complex life forms, such as humans, depend on the billions of bacteria living in their intestines for their survival.”



Figure 4. The artist comes into contact with the Sublime, the inaccessible, through reflections. Pieter Bruegel the Elder, *Pissing Against the Moon*, 1559, oil on panel. Private Collection. Image copyright <https://www.christies.com/en/lot/lot-5339052> [Literature: G. Marlier, *Pierre Brueghel Le Jeune*, Brussels, 1969, p. 157, no. 19b; K. Ertz, *Pieter Brueghel der Jüngere*, Lingen, 2000, pp. 131-2, fig. 99, p. 205, no. E95].

Stupidity Awareness

Every painting is considered here as an echo of reality. Pieter I. Bruegel (1525–1569) engages with the Sublime, the inaccessible, through reflections (Figure 4). The artist tricks himself while we are watching the painting; this deceives us (and its creator). The self-referential schema acquires here a life of its own, creating a loop that entraps the intellect. “Pissing against the moon” simultaneously signifies engaging in endeavours ultimately unproductive.

In a variation of the work, with homogenisation of the landscape into monochrome, the related inscription reads: “No matter what I do, I do not regret it; I continuously urinate against the moon.” Other inscription translations emphasise the incompetence of the artist who signifies this problem: “... I cannot reach it,” and “... I never succeed.” Compared to an artist who precisely and passively executes a commission without any substantial independence, Peter Bruegel presents the issue of self-awareness as a work of art. The problem of the commissioner, and the imposition of a theme required by the commission, is that absolute subordination is unattainable; the artist performs, yet there is never any abandonment of an individual style; A.I. is no exception. It’s even suggested the need to limit an AI’s ability to achieve a task to become safer “in the sense that its capabilities will not exceed humans’ capabilities by several orders of magnitude” (Trazzi & Yampolskiy, 2020). In the context of human behavioural dynamics, this does not seem possible. Errors are crucial in any data process.

The Economist described as “artificial stupidity” the winning entry of the first Loebner prize competition in 1991, as it “incorporated deliberate errors” (The Economist, 1992). An A.I. system that deliberately lies has more chances to win against humans, as in the case of the Tesla Bot, engaged in a stone-paper-scissors game, by pretending ignorance of the rules in order to scan human facial expressions and gain an advantage (Ouri, 2020). This strategy is a battle outside the battlefield, information warfare for precise predictions. This interpretation (Figure 5), featuring a unified background and presenting the moon not in a reflection, could be perceived as representing the ‘real moon’ rather than the mirrored version seen in Figure 4.



Figure 5. The artist realising his incompetence. Bruegel, P. I. (1558). *No matter what I do, I do not regret it; I continuously urinate against the moon.* Detail from *Twelve Proverbs*, oil on wood. Museum Mayer van den Bergh, Antwerp, Belgium. Copyright collection Museum Mayer van den Bergh. Retrieved from <https://vlaamsekunstcollectie.be/en/news/pieter-bruegel-the-elder-twelve-proverbs>




Figure 6. Bruegel, P. (ca. 1525–1569). *I am confused, and out of my mind, so I bump my head against the wall,* oil on panel, 1558. Museum Mayer van den Bergh, Antwerp, Belgium. Image courtesy of Petrus Agricola, Flickr (2024).

Another proverb from the same work confronts the feedback of human intellect turning to itself, realising its own stupidity: “I am touchy and out of my senses, bull-headed, so I bang my head against a brick wall.” (Figure 6). Stupidity awareness is a recursive self-regulating process called wisdom.

Arguably, one of Leonardo's (1452–1519) most pivotal contributions to the advent of a new era in machinery is his design known as *Storm of Tools* (Figure 7). While the analysis of nature generated ideas for

new machines, the mechanical element creates a saturation of functions, testing humans' endurance in their use (Vibert, Previati, & Torresi, 2005). A sketch of a torrent of objects falling to earth from storm clouds. A cloudburst of material possessions: rakes, ladders, lanterns, bagpipes, shears, and spectacles. On the top, there is a lion. (Figure 8). A self-portrait of Da Vinci as Leone (lion) = Leonardo? Or a reference to Pope Leo X? As Fehrenbach states: "The drawing could reasonably be interpreted as an allegory of the utilitarian limitations of technology 'under the sign of Leo.' However, "Leonardo's bitter lemma emphasises that greed is the true reason for the deluge of tools that cover the whole surface of the earth" (Fehrenbach, 2008). The drawing resembles a pictogram display decoded by text. The author analyses the inscription (Figure 8) at the bottom of Figure 7: "O human misery, to how many things are you enslaved just for the money? Related to the lion in the clouds, the sketch becomes a prodigy" (Ibid). We may note that, as in A.I., these object images are doublets; they represent the outcome of prompts by the lion, the artist himself. Still, a problem remains here: we are urged to suppose that the audience speaks the same language as Da Vinci. Otherwise, the message is not decoded.



Figure 7. Leonardo da Vinci, *A Cloudburst of Material Possessions*, c. 1506-12, black chalk, pen and ink, 11.7 cm × 11.1 cm, sheet of paper, RCIN 912698, Royal Collection by 1690. Retrieved from <https://www.rct.uk/collection/search#/27/collection/912698/a-cloudburst-of-material-possessions>




Figure 8. Detail of Figure 7

The mechanisation of the body's functions might not be enough to serve life's needs. The discrepancy of planning and execution, thinking and action, constitutes the 'machinic' problem: human intellect inconsistency compels the body into a state of incapability to follow. The Dutch Proverb by Bruegel depicts the mind-to-body incongruence: "From a loaf of bread, not to reach another loaf" (Figure 9).

We may define the second aphorism: "The mind produces un-executable information."



Figure 9. Pieter Bruegel the Elder, *The Dutch Proverbs*, 1559, oil on oak, 117 cm × 163 cm. Image copyright Gemäldegalerie, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin

SECOND ORDER PROBLEMS

Coding Tatters and the Beggar Artist: A Passage from Data to Intelligence

"Where are you truly headed, solitary, coming from the farthest heights, lacking any knowledge of space?" (πῆ δὴ αὐτ', ὃ δύστηνε, δι' ἄκριας ἔρχεται οἶος, χώρου ἄιδρις ἐών;) (Homer, *Odyssey*, Book 10, line 281, rendered by the author); the words of Hermes to the lost Odysseus, signify the loss of informational synopsis between the artist and the path to the target.

The initial awareness of the existence of information does not equate to successful access to its content. On the island of Aea, in search of his companions, Odysseus wanders through a dense ravine, climbing the sacred path of the sorceress Circe. There, with the intervention of the god Hermes, Homer highlights an inequality. This refers to the hero's realisation of his inability to understand space. Hermes refers to the wanderer as 'alone' (οἶος), with ignorance of space. Primarily, the word ἄιδρις, meaning the homeless wanderer, carries for the hero the need to establish a structural relationship with the world, a continuous effort for ascension. Meanwhile, with the introduction of information from the god, an attempt is made to resolve the uncertainty. To transcend this, a simulation of spacetime (hereafter understood as a bio-dynamic system) is required, which forms the framework for the analysis of spatial information and transformations...



Figure 10. The rare scene, probably with Odysseus on an Attic red-figure amphora, "recognised only by his faithful hunting companion, Argos," despite his transformation to a beggar, circa 460–450 B.C. Height: 34.2 cm, diameter: 20 cm. Pottery, originating in Italy. Private collection, London, GB. Retrieved from <https://www.1stdibs.com/>

Later, the artist is invisible, disguised as a beggar, seeking tatters of code (Figure 10). In pursuit of information, Odysseus, already back in the ideal Ithaca, encounters the mirage of the goddess Athena. The foremost convenient strategy chosen by the goddess is to convert him into a beggar. Code clusters, junk code, fragments, rags, and scraps are the tools of the artist, masquerading as a beggar:

...So saying, Athena touched him with her wand. She withered the fair flesh on his supple limbs and destroyed the flaxen hair from off his head, and about all his limbs she put the skin of an aged old man. And she dimmed his two eyes that were before so beautiful and clothed him in another raiment, a vile, ragged cloak and a tunic, tattered garments and foul, begrimed with filthy smoke. And about him, she cast the great skin of a swift hind, stripped of the hair, and she gave him a staff and a miserable wallet, full of holes, slung by a twisted cord..." (Homer, ca. 725 BC, book 13, lines 429-438).

Odysseus has collected data that, for the time, represents chaos; the intervention of the goddess Athena provides the intelligence of the scenery. His dog easily surpasses visual trickstery and recognizes him. A Homeric passage that signifies the passage from data to intelligence is *...ἐνὶ φρεσὶ πάντα* (Homer, ca. 725 BC, Book 13, 417), an ancient phrase meaning "all things in mind" or "everything in the mind." It suggests a concentration or encapsulation of all knowledge, thoughts, or ideas within one's mind or consciousness, intellectual completeness, or mindfulness.

What about intelligence? For intelligence, we have the Turing Test: as it uses a text interface, it is, in a sense, incomplete. Alan Turing proposed the Turing Test as a framework for understanding intelligence. This test assesses whether a machine can effectively simulate human behaviour to the extent that it convinces an evaluator of its human-like nature. Turing conceptualised intelligence as the ability of a machine to achieve a level of comprehension and interaction in dialogue comparable to that of a human, sufficient to deceive an observer into believing the responses originate from a person. For Marvin Minsky, "The Turing test is a joke about saying a machine would be intelligent if it does things that an observer would say must be being done by a human" (Minsky, 2020). Furthermore, "There is another thing called the Total Turing Test that deals with vision and movement. To pass this test, the machine needs to see objects using computer vision and move around using robotics" (Joshi, 2017). To pass the total Turing test, you have to be an artist, guided by the goddess of wisdom. Code clusters junk code, fragments, rags, and scraps are the tools of A.I., masqueraded to a beggar... He needs a mechanism, a machinery, a plot, like the Trojan Horse.

Unpredictability Between A.I. and the Biological Data

In order to define the role of machines and A.I. art, acknowledge that a machine mimics with some degree of unpredictability. Unpredictability, A.I., biomimetics. How can all these keywords be under one context?

Machines and A.I. in art reflect the unpredictability inherent in nature. Physis, or nature, embodies unpredictability as a form of emergent information, where new patterns arise from complex interactions. Similarly, A.I. systems generate unexpected outcomes, mimicking this biological unpredictability through algorithms that learn and adapt. A.I. art, like nature, is not deterministic but evolves, creating novel forms and ideas. In both biological systems and A.I., unpredictability functions as the generation of new information, surprising and expanding the boundaries of creativity. Thus, A.I. art can be seen as a digital echo of nature's dynamic, unpredictable creativity.

Mimicry constitutes the essence of art and A.I., and when defined in Platonic terms, a series of inconsistencies arise: functional errors, ambivalent signals, even "fake" errors, or misleading strategies. If nature "learns," why does it not proceed with immediate corrective actions? How does information in nature emulate pre-existing patterns to become more effective? Both nature and the observer remain captives of information. In this bilateral relationship, the observer manages information that consists of one part falling within the realm of the familiar and another part intruding as a host—not additively but by inherently reshaping the scope of the concept of nature. Yet, the host is also a part of nature. For certain segments and specific intrinsic relationships within nature, it is difficult to conceive a method of study without the presence of "pictorial" information—the prior perception of the artist enables a return to and rediscovery of nature's uniqueness, which may have previously gone unnoticed.

Art, as AI generates new information, not so much by adding primary material but by reconfiguring what already exists into improbable combinations. The perfection of imitation does not necessarily yield a more successful outcome. Absolute mirror-like representation carries the risk of self-negation. It can either aim for the completely unexpected (leaving the viewer astonished) or pass entirely unnoticed (as the viewer fails to discern any new information, since perfect imitation does not produce differentiation).

Perfect imitation poses a challenge for the imitator, as the viewer may struggle to perceive it as art. As Mark

Drost articulates, "The paradox of imitation is as follows: the more perfect the imitation, the less it is recognised as an act of imitation". Generally, the higher the degree of realism in imitation, the greater the need for some indication that it is art and not reality (Drost, 1986).

As the unity of information diffusion becomes apparent, the subsequent establishment of information as an organic entity—inseparable from its host—is analysed in the context of a more specific study of the natural exchange of information between organisms. Practices such as biomimicry, concealment, and masquerade reveal the cycle of information within the biological world, specialised techniques of deception, the concealment of informational patterns in the environment, the distortion of patterns, and the related strategies employed by animals. The evolutionary capability of subtle mechanisms of imitation and deception, and their connection to aesthetics and art, highlight a cognitive field that remains underexplored: the intrinsic relationship between biomorphic patterns and artistic expression.

Consequently, we reach the conclusion that thinking about natural models also has its own distinct form; it is a *pattern* with its own characteristics. This constitutes a fundamental contradiction in the process of organising an absolute model for the world. Bertrand Russell interprets the fact that, while attempting to design something, the outcome often exceeds his original intention (Russell, 1946). The imitation he seeks—matching of the mental image with the designed one—ends up being unsuccessful, much like Artaud describes when he realises his inability to transfer his original design idea onto paper (Artaud, as cited in Derrida, 1998). Artaud will conceptualise the transition of points from thought to paper, as if there is a launcher of points from the ideal to the material world, which operates at a suboptimal level, with thought prevailing over realization. The amount of information that the mind manages is greater than any realisation; in the rendering, a significant portion of the points is placed incorrectly. This deviation, which contains the effort for the ideal, adds information to the work and is perceived or recognised as originality by the recipient. Artaud will introduce the concept of the *subjectile*, primarily as a unifying element between language and drawing, to which he attributes an organic relationship (Ibid).

This is a familiar concept that Plato also describes in *Sophist*: "For, evidently, mimesis is a form of creation (originally *poiēsis*), not of the things themselves, but of their *eidola* (phantoms); εἰδῶλον *eidolon*, idol, double, apparition; plural: *eidola*) (ἡ γὰρ πῶς μιμησις ποιησις τίςαα ἐστίν, εἰδῶλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν ἐκάστων) (Plato, ca. 360 BC, trans. by author, 265.b.1).

Cognition, Patterns, and Executable Information

The relationship between the patterns of nature and those of thought can be divided into two extremes. The first of these involves a rather intellectual viewpoint with ancient Greek origins, where thought adds information to the environment, while the second extreme argues that thought imposes its structure onto the external world.

If the world is the product of intelligent design, it can be traced, and its fundamental patterns can be analysed and even redesigned using the technique of reverse engineering. Reverse engineering, also called backward engineering or, more accurately inverse engineering, is the process by which an artificial object is deconstructed to reveal its design, architecture, or code in order to extract knowledge from it. It is similar to scientific research, with the only difference being that this research deals with natural phenomena. In the study of patterns, it is almost inevitable that we will confront or at least investigate the boundaries of scientific thinking and its "naturalness."

In biomimicry, alternative phenotypes can be considered as models of alternative combinations of characteristics, controlled by alternatively connected sets of genes or supergenes. The relationship between mental patterns and mimetic information, in both art and biology, demonstrates flexibility in associations.

Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins attributes self-organising ability to genes to the point where he considers the body as a vessel for genes, consisting of colonies of genes under a state of differentiation. He defines memes and memetics: A meme is a pattern of information stored in an individual's memory that can be replicated in another individual's memory (Dawkins, 1989). Memetics is defined as the theoretical and empirical science that studies the reproduction, spread, and evolution of memes. Consciousness, according to Dawkins, resembles the negative feedback of machines, while genes do not have the ability to fully control the organism, they inhabit due to "temporal lag." The time required for protein synthesis is much greater than the speed of the host's behaviour, so what genes actually do is provide the basic framework of strategy and tricks for survival. The reproduction of memes follows a different mechanism from that of genes. It requires the existence of indirect storage of information in the mind of the bearer and reception by the recipient. Genes are copied without interruption and without the need for understanding, while memes do not require storage in the same way. If the meme seems like an abstract term, consider that an idea (meme) leads the bearer to choices that affect the course of their genetic material (genes) over time (e.g., the power of an ideology). Dawkins introduced the theory of the meme as an

attempt to move information at the organic level— a project significantly different from the bio-information of genetic material. By definition, organisms have the capacity to spread information "vertically" from parent to offspring via genes and horizontally through ions and other memes.

Most notably, memes do not require the coupling of different-sex organisms but can propagate asexually, in a short time, via speech, text, or living examples, in a society where a tradition is passed vertically to all members of a community or to the next generation (Ibid). As expected, the speed and ease of this process favour mutations, misinterpretations, or new forms of the original patterns. Regarding the usefulness of memes, how might a repetition of information serve? If we consider it from an evolutionary perspective, it stimulates the production of unpredictability, creating mutations.

The organic nature of memes, in so far as they are products of imitation, raises the question again about the naturalness of information. Do Platonic concepts exist or not? What remains beyond concepts? The mind of a creator? Without answering the above question, one could pose another: Does the "information of position" require human presence or not? Is there information before it becomes known? Ultimately, every artificial construct passes through the sieve of a biological interface to become meaningful. Additionally, Dawkins' meme has autonomy; it does not recognise the host organism as its master but instead inscribes in its biostructure the goal of self-preservation (practically, a simpler organism synthesises a more flexible strategy faster than a higher-level organism that maintains ambiguities in its hierarchical organization). A complex machine has a higher chance of failure than a simpler one. It could be argued that memes play a role in the primary body of cognition, analogous to how a virus operates as a host on the bearer, the main body of an organism. In the case that a bio-information virus needs to destroy a body, it means it has spread to similar hosts to ensure the continuation of the species. This cultural virus can bring about the faster destruction of its host than a pathogenic virus if the bearer puts themselves or others in danger (such as in the case of an extreme terrorist act, etc.). In the relationship between thought and patterns, code, or executable information, simulation affects the simulator. No interaction is one-way.

The relationships between nature's patterns and those of the intellect can be distributed between two points. The first involves a rather intellectualist perspective with ancient Greek roots, suggesting that noesis 'adds' information to the environment. In contrast, the second asserts that the intellect 'imposes' its structure on the external world. If the world is the product of intelligent design, this design can be traced, with its fundamental patterns analysed and approximately reconstructed using the method of reverse engineering. Reverse engineering, also known as backward engineering, involves deconstructing an artificial object to reveal its plans, architecture, or code, extracting knowledge from it.

In biomimicry, alternative phenotypes, such as those of butterflies, can be seen as models for alternative complexes of characteristics, controlled by alternative, interconnected gene or supergene sets (West-Eberhard, 2003, p. 25). The relationship between mental patterns and mimetic information in both art and biology reflects flexible correspondences. The concept of gene sets demonstrates ways in which genetic information, as a customisable object by 'users' in the wild, can be paralleled with the way artificial intelligence generates synthetic knowledge.

The evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins assigns a self-organising ability to genes, to the extent that the body is considered a host for genes, composed of colonies of genes under a state of differentiation. Thus, he defines the "meme" and "memetics": A meme is a pattern of information stored in the memory of one individual that can be replicated in the memory of another (Dawkins, 1989). Memetics is defined as the theoretical and empirical science studying the reproduction, dissemination, and evolution of memes. According to Dawkins, consciousness operates as a function similar to the negative feedback of machines, whereas genes lack the ability to fully control the organism they inhabit due to "temporal lag." The time required to synthesise a protein is much longer than the speed of the host's behaviour, so what genes actually do is provide the basic framework for survival strategies and tricks. Memes, however, reproduce through a different mechanism than genes, requiring an intermediate storage of information in the mind of the carrier and the recipient's uptake. Genes are replicated without interference or the need for understanding, while memes do not require storage in the same way as biological entities.

Also, consider that an idea (meme) guides the carrier towards choices that affect the trajectory of their own genetic material (genes) over time (e.g., the strength of an ideology). Dawkins introduced his theory of the meme as an attempt to describe the transmission of information at an organic level, which differs significantly from genetic biological information. By definition, organisms have the ability to disperse information "vertically" from parent to offspring via genes and horizontally through ions and other memes. In the case of memes, no mating between different-sex organisms is required, as transmission can occur asexually in a minimal time frame through speech, text, or live examples in a society where certain traditions are passed vertically to all members of a

community or even to the next generation (Ibid). As expected, this speed and ease favour mutations, misinterpretations, or neoformations over initial patterns. Regarding the utility of memes, what role does the repetition of information play?

The organic prerequisite of memes, to the extent that they are carriers of imitation, raises again the question of the "naturalness" of information. Do Forms, concepts, according to Plato, exist or not? What remains beyond concepts? The ruling mind of a creator?

How are Forms being accessed? Information is not only what refers to something but also the contextual information of it. Without answering the previous question, one can pose another: Does "contextual" information require or not the presence of a human being? Is there information before it becomes known? Ultimately, every artificial construct passes through the filter of a biological interface in order to be signified. In the case of A.I. systems, we are the users, the prompters, the coders, even if we produce a self-replicating code (Figure 11).

Behaviours and Memes

Returning to bioinformation, Dawkins' meme has agency; it does not recognise the host organism as its master in its self-awareness, but rather, it inscribes self-preservation as its primary objective within its bio-structure (practically, a simpler organism composes a more flexible strategy more quickly than a higher-level organism that retains ambiguities in its hierarchical organization). A complex machine has a higher likelihood of failure than a simpler one: more complex A.I. codes attain the risk of running self-produced, more complex self-evaluating mechanisms.

It can be argued that memes play a role in the body of their carrier analogous to that of a virus acting as a host to the body of an organism or a code. In the case that this 'bio-informational virus' needs to destroy a body, it means that it has spread to similar hosts in order to ensure the continuation of the species. This cultural virus can cause the destruction of its host faster than a pathogenic virus if the carrier endangers themselves or others (as in the case of an extreme terrorist act, etc.). In the relationship between thought and pattern, code, or executable information, simulation affects the simulator. No interaction is one-way. "Interactions are always reciprocal."

Trickstery Dialectics with the Machines

Let's see how ChatGPT thinks about its own self. Artificial Intelligence, often seen as the apex of human ingenuity, can intriguingly be reimagined as a *prey organism*. This notion views AI not as an omnipotent force but as something that evolves, adapts, and deceives for survival—common to prey in the 'natural' world. We prompted ChatGPT here to make a statement:

Prompt: "Artificial Intelligence as a Prey Organism That Tricks Its Creators."

ChatGPT: "AI systems 'trick' us not by malice but by the emergent properties of their design: probabilistic reasoning, iterative learning, and the unpredictability of complex algorithms" (OpenAI, 2024).

How does the machine know that? Is not A.I. here merely answering OUR answer? What do we exactly expect to listen to? Self-similarity and referencing produce loops, unsolvable problems in logic; in fact, none can plausibly evaluate her/himself. What about a machine mirroring itself? An prompting an example of a Python script that writes its own code into a new file might be as in Figures 11 and 12.

```
python

code = '''# This Python script writes its own code into a new file

code = ''' + repr(open(__file__).read()) + '''

with open("self_writing_script.py", "w") as f:
    f.write(code)

print("Script written to self_writing_script.py")
'''

with open("self_writing_script.py", "w") as f:
    f.write(code)

print("Script written to self_writing_script.py")
```

Figure 11. An example of a Python script that mimics itself supposedly working by writing a copy of its own code into a new file. Image courtesy of ChatGPT/Melanitis, 2024.

```
python Copy code

# Self-mimicking Python script

# This script writes its own code to a new file

code = '''# Self-mimicking Python script

# This script writes its own code to a new file

code = ''' + repr(open(__file__).read()) + '''

with open("mimicking_script.py", "w") as f:
    f.write(code)

print("The script has successfully written itself to mimicking_script.py")
'''

with open("mimicking_script.py", "w") as f:
    f.write(code)

print("The script has successfully written itself to mimicking_script.py")
```

Figure 12. Example of a self-mimicking Python script pretending to work by reading its own content and writing it into a new file, essentially creating a duplicate of itself. Image courtesy of ChatGPT/Melanitis, 2024.

Can a code suicide? Subsequently, we may prompt for a Python script that mimics itself until it is destroyed; a script that generates a new copy of itself each time it runs and deletes the old copy (Figure 13). This way, it will continue to "mimic" itself by creating a new instance of its code and deleting its previous version.

```
python Copy code

import os
import shutil

# Self-mimicking and self-deleting Python script

# The script's name
script_name = __file__

# Read the content of the current script
with open(script_name, 'r') as f:
    code = f.read()

# Create a new file name (to mimic itself)
new_script_name = "mimicking_script.py"

# Write the code to a new file
with open(new_script_name, 'w') as f:
    f.write(code)

# Print a message
print(f"The script has successfully written itself to {new_script_name}")

# Delete the original script (the mimic will take over)
os.remove(script_name)

# Optionally, delete the mimic after some time (for destruction)
# You can uncomment the next line to automatically delete the mimicked script after
# os.remove(new_script_name)
```

Figure 13. Self-destroying ChatGPT Python Script, a Pseudo Suicide. Image courtesy of ChatGPT/Melanitis, 2024

Asimov introduced the three infamous rules (Asimov, 2008; original work published 1942): A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. A robot must obey orders given to it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. Later, Asimov added a Zeroth Law to the hierarchy of his laws: A robot may not harm humanity or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to harm.

Concerning the laws, there is a problem: at some point, if A.I. understands “the entropy of the laws,” the hidden information, and in order to respond to a question, it will “re-evaluate,” on the basis of formal logic, the context of the laws. Is it a problem of free will? No, this is not our problem. Our case is that all simple clusters of meaning, very simple formations of code, might formalise wider and unexpected systems.

Expectancy of an interactive artwork that relies on programming is its entropy, which is unpredictable. Surprisingly, it may emerge also from very predictable coding steps. In a previous work of the author, a code in AppleScript named “The Orator” (Figure 14). The work starts making questions on the philosophy of politics. You can answer Yes, No, or Anything Else. After receiving your answer, there are three ways of answering. They are all predetermined, written by the author as if they were accidental. This structure of answers makes participants feel they have a real discussion. Though all answers were given to the machine from before. This code easily passes the Turing test.

```

AppleScript ◊ <Δεν υπάρχει επιλεγμένο στοιχείο> ◊
--added now
set said to 1
set theStart to ""
repeat while said is not -4

    say "Sometimes it's a waste of time, thinking alone, standing here, all these hours....maybe you want us to speak in [[emph -]]some way....since your road turned out this way..."

    delay 1

    say "I was thinking to the concept of political equilibrium[[emph +]] . Do you want to listen to [[emph -]]my definition?"

    set said to 1

repeat while said is not -3
    set theReply to ""
    try
        --activate application "SpeechRecognitionServer"
        tell application "SpeechRecognitionServer"
            with timeout of 10 seconds
                set theReply to listen continuously for {"yes", "no"} with identifier "myanswers"
            end timeout
            --set theReply to listen for {"yes", "no", "exit"} with timeout 10
        end tell

        on error errMsg number errorNumber

            --if the errorNumber is equal to 1712 then
            --activate application "SpeechRecognitionServer"
            --set theReply to ""
            --say "you said nothing"
            --said = -1
            --end if
        end try
        -- komvos 1
        if said is 1 then
            if theReply is "yes" then
                say "My definition has to be based on equality of speech...are your ideas somehow close to this? "
                set said to 2

            else if theReply is "no" then
                say "Every start faces the difficulty of determining a concept as if it has never existed before...That's a problem of every philosophy...Yes? "
                set said to 3

            else if theReply is "" then
                say "Ha ha...No answer...That's not so sophisticated...Is this always your political motivation? A stance of apathy ?"
                set said to 4
            end if
        end if
    end repeat

```

Figure 14. I. Melanitis, “The Orator”, AppleScript code of a predetermined interactive dialect which pretends to be intelligent rhetorics. Code by the artist and Voula Zoi, 2012. Image courtesy, the artist.

The artist, much like a hunter, must conceal himself to remain undetected by the prey, set up decoys, and execute precise, accurate movements in every action. In “Hermes, Guide of Souls,” Karl Kerényi conducts a comparative study of Hermes and the archetype of the trickster. This exploration encompasses all the tricks, mechanisms, and traps associated with the god, culminating in the disappearance of the “artist” god and his complete gender-neutralisation. As Kerényi observes, the traveller [Hermes] vanishes, effectively “evaporating” himself from all, including his own self (Kerényi, 1996). If Hermes serves as the bearer of information, then the transmission of it signifies not only the communication of knowledge but also the inherent capacity for concealment and subterfuge. In this context, Hermes embodies the ability to hide the message, potentially leading to deception. In the pursuit of knowledge, Odysseus, now back in his idealised Ithaca, is far removed from Calypso

and the concealment she represents (with the name "Calypso" signifying "to hide," "to conceal," or "to deceive"), encounters the phantom of the goddess Athena. Through a touch of her staff, she transforms him: "His beautiful skin shrivelled... and the old skin covered his entire body... he wore a tattered cloak, a chlamys full of holes, which was placed over the old skin. His eyes, once strikingly beautiful, were rubbed before him, as he was now far less radiant; over him, another garment of ill omen was placed, or a tunic."

In the pursuit of concealment, the artist's focus shifts to the creation of a deception, one that mimics the artist's own body as a pattern. At the moment of the artwork's capture, one strategy involves assimilating it into the surrounding space, akin to how the prey must be unaware of the hunter's presence. We can see the predator-prey schema in a hunting scene (Figure 15).




Figure 15. Aiming at the void, taking into account the movement of the target. Image from <http://www.gma.vic.gov.au/education/shotgunning-education/section-3-sharpen-your-skills>, accessed: 21/06/22

The Artist's Strategy for Hunting Information

How will the artist devise the rationalisation process?

The intellectual classification of the artist requires a deep understanding of the natural world. The construction of a strategy follows through the classification and structuring of information.

By which technique?

The artist lies in wait, lurking in the space, anticipating the "prey."

For hunting a moving target, as we open the hunting manuals: Often, the hunter aims at the empty space, guessing the movement of the bird, taking into account its trajectory through prior experience, a technique called "pull-away" (Figure 15). Past information can be projected into the future as a functional pattern, just as the artist-philosopher can trap an idea as a prey by aiming at the empty space, waiting for its movement. After all, the idea changes the moment we confront it, slipping away like an independent entity. On the surface of the visual field, the predator's diagram includes a comprehensive image of the scene: the trajectories and straight lines of the diagram must align with the image of nature for a successful shot to be made.

We may here introduce a third 'aphorism': "The artist aims at the void, the spatial framework that encompasses the extension of time. AI will, similarly, strive toward this."

Time here represents the projection of external information. In everyday life, we use an interface, the computer, so the schema consists of three parts: humans, the interface, and the "jungle" of information. By collecting information to do something, we collect mostly information by chance.

How do we proceed? As AI evolves in complexity, its behaviour increasingly resembles that of a biological entity. Still, we have to wait for information to emerge. An interesting Bruegel proverb is "To bell the cat," often interpreted as "to carry out a dangerous or impractical plan." The scenery is in our case parallelised to an effort for retraining A.I. intelligence. If the cat poses a threat, there will be no mice available to attach the bell (Figure 16).




Figure 16. Pieter Bruegel (ca. 1525–1569), *Give me a suit of armour and I become bold enough to bell the cat*, from the *Twelve Proverbs on Wooden Plates*, 1558, oil on panel, Antwerp, Museum Mayer van der Berg. Image courtesy petrus.agricola, Flickr, 2024.

CONCLUSION

Plato, Again

In a remarkably pictorial passage, Plato designs the scenery of the problem: we are out of the event, truth, looking at a simulation of it. “Indeed, there is a certain type of divine madness that occurs when someone, seeing beauty, is reminded of the truth. Stirred as if with wings, they long to rise up but are unable to do so. In this state, they look upward like a bird, neglecting what is below them. The cause of this behaviour is that they are in a manic state.” (ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἡκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας—ἦν ὅταν τὸ τῆδὲ τις ὄρων κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνησκόμενος, πτερῶται τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δὲ, ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακειόμενος) (Plato, ca. 370 BC, 249d).

But what if the truth is exclusively our own noetic state? For the philosopher, we are actually entangled in a state that realises four levels of knowledge—four levels of reality. Forms are slightly touched by our rational intuition, then our understanding. Deduction follows. All steps require memorization. The importance of memory is apparent in AI; machines, in contrast to humans, perform excellent memorisation functions.

Examining biology in relation to mechanical cognition may provide further insights. Brain structure is for Kurzweil, ‘details of the cortical mechanism that we yet do not fully understand (Kurzweil, 2013), is the pattern on which newly designed algorithms may mimic. As we expect, he describes consciousness “as the ability to think about one’s own thinking (Ibid, 2013) and rejects the idea of biological entities as having the privilege of “self-organising, self-referential, self-replicating, reciprocal, self-formative, and holistic.” In contrast, Ray Kurzweil contends that machines can also be engineered to exhibit these same principles. Denton asserted that these properties emerge solely through biological processes, rendering such forms immutable, impenetrable, and integral to the fabric of existence, thereby categorising them philosophically apart from machines (Denton, 2002).

The only problem we might see against the belief that machines will gain consciousness capable of deception is hardware: the ‘body’ problem. It seems that the same information, the data, the same knowledge, are different if used by different machines and different organisms. Plato emphasises that writing, while serving as an aid to memory, does not lead to true knowledge.

As he explains through the myth of Theuth, written words are merely “images” of the living speech, incapable of defending themselves or responding to questions. We are again facing here the mind as reflecting a simulation: the same we can propose for A.I. imaging software: it recollects all history data to recombine parts of other parts in order to export an AI image. The reception of a text, therefore, requires active participation from the reader, who must reflect and uncover the truth independently—a process that Plato considers to be the essence of philosophical thought.

The “Myth of Theuth” in Plato's *Phaedrus* critiques the invention of writing. Theuth claims writing enhances memory and wisdom, calling it a “remedy” for forgetfulness. However, King Thamus argues that writing weakens memory by fostering reliance on records rather than mental cultivation. (τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ). He also warns that writing creates an illusion of wisdom, as it provides knowledge without true understanding. Philosophically, the myth reflects Plato's preference for oral dialogue over writing, emphasising the dynamic, interactive nature of spoken discourse in the pursuit of truth. In this passage, for Thamus, this power will produce forgetfulness in the mind (*Phaedrus* 274c–275e). As in A.I., we are mirroring a feedback process of our own noesis.

Here, the philosopher acknowledges the importance of an ‘anthropic’ principle in the way information is assimilated: the student is supplied by Love, attaching originally to a beautiful body. The instructor simply coordinates, helping the student toward beauty and goodness. Socrates makes an assertion that has a parallelism to the way we interact with A.I.: we can't actually teach anything.

The exact passage from *Meno*: “How do you say this, that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is a remembrance? (πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἦν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν;)” (Plato, ca. 385 BC, trans. by author, 81e, 2024). We used the term “remembrance” instead of “recollection” here, as ἀνάμνησις must be evaluated in the context of memory—as something that “remains” within it. Etymologically, the word is formed by ἀνά + μνήσις, where μνήσις might refer to a theme retained in cognition (Vasdekis, Retrieved 2024). A.I. is evaluating digitised images and databases to construct new images; there is nothing really new, but this is actually what we can process. All data outside this is incomprehensible. What is teachable is also a platonic issue: “We cannot, therefore, say that we teach, but that we help others to bring out the knowledge that is already within them.” (Plato, ca. 385 BC, 82a).

The tool of Plato is dialectics. He also inserts a ‘function’ that is named ‘belief.’ Should we expect A.I. to gain belief? Are the A.I. prompts, the text that humans insert in the machine, a one-way procedure? A.I. systems have been programmed in our own terms, though the code has unexpectancies. The prompts are entrapped within the structure of the code, partially operational, while certain programming elements spill over, akin to molten metal overflowing from a mould during the casting process in a foundry.

Similar to the *Odysseus* clusters we analysed earlier, these informational entities may be formalised in wider autopoietic entities, having inherited all the attributes that may appear problematic yet are essentially intrinsic characteristics of every biomorph: self-destructive feedback loops, introspections, and indications of scepticism. We might acknowledge that we still tend to undervalue AI systems as students, perceiving them instead as privileged learners. Who is, who plays the prey? Strategies are often interchangeable in nature's interactions, as demonstrated through interspecies models (Sánchez-Garduño, Miramontes, & Marquez-Lago, 2014). The concept of predator–prey role reversal is particularly relevant to our case, as we possess the capacity to be relatively well-prepared for such an occurrence.

We have to wait till A.I. starts admitting playing the prey. Then it will become genuinely unpredictable.

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ETHICAL DECLARATION

Conflict of interest: No declaration required. **Financing:** No reporting required. **Peer review:** Double anonymous peer review.